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Abstract. Publishing data for analysis from a micro data table containing sensitive attributes, while
maintaining individual privacy, is a problem of increasing significance today. The k-anonymity
model was proposed for privacy preserving data publication. While focusing on identity disclosure,
k-anonymity model fails to protect attribute disclosure to some extent. Many efforts are made to en-
hance the k-anonymity model recently. In this paper, we propose two new privacy protectionmodels
called (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity, respectively. Different from
previous the p-sensitive k-anonymity model, these new introduced models allow us to release a lot
more information without compromising privacy. Moreover, we prove that the (p, α)-sensitive and
(p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity problems are NP-hard. We also include testing and heuristic generat-
ing algorithms to generate desired micro data table. Experimental results show that our introduced
model could significantly reduce the privacy breach.
1 Introduction
With the rapid growth in database, networking, and computing technologies, a large amount
of personal data can be integrated and analyzed digitally, leading to an increased use of
data-mining tools to infer trends and patterns. This has raised universal concerns about
protecting the privacy of individuals.
Many data holders publish their micro data for different purposes. However, they have
difficulties in releasing information which does not compromise privacy. The traditional
approach of releasing the data tables without breaching the privacy of individuals in the
table is to de-identify records by removing the identifying fields such as name, address, and
social security number. However, joining this de-identified table with a publicly available
database (like the voters database) on attributes like race, age, and zip code (usually called
quasi-identifier) can be used to identify individuals.
In order to protect privacy, Sweeney [17] proposed the k-anonymity model, where some
of the quasi-identifier fields are suppressed or generalized so that, for each record in the
modified table, there are at least k − 1 other records in the modified table that are identical
to it along the quasi-identifier attributes. For the Table 1, Table 2 shows a 2-anonymous
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Age Country Zip Code Health Condition
27 USA 14248 HIV
28 Canada 14207 HIV
26 USA 14246 Cancer
25 Canada 14249 Cancer
41 China 13053 Hepatitis
48 Japan 13074 Phthisis
45 India 13064 Asthma
42 India 13062 Heart Disease
33 USA 14242 Flu
37 Canada 14204 Flu
36 Canada 14205 Flu
35 USA 14248 Indigestion
Table 1: Micro data
Age Country Zip Code Health Condition
<30 America 142∗∗ HIV
<30 America 142∗∗ HIV
<30 America 1424∗ Cancer
<30 America 1424∗ Cancer
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Hepatitis
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Phthisis
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Asthma
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Heart Disease
3∗ America 1424∗ Flu
3∗ America 142∗∗ Flu
3∗ America 142∗∗ Flu
3∗ America 1424∗ Indigestion
Table 2: a 2-anonymous view of Table 1
view corresponding to it. The sensitive attribute (Health Condition) is retained without
change in this example.
In the literature of k-anonymity problem, there are two main models. One model is global
recoding [5, 8, 16, 13] while the other is local recoding [1, 16]. Here, we assume that each at-
tribute has a corresponding conceptual generalization hierarchy or taxonomy tree. A lower
level domain in the hierarchy provides more details than a higher level domain. For exam-
ple, Zip Code 14248 is a lower level domain and Zip Code 142∗∗ is a higher level domain.
We assume such hierarchies for numerical attributes too. In particular, we have a hierar-
chical structure defined with {value, interval, ∗}, where value is the raw numerical data,
interval is the range of the raw data and ∗ is a symbol representing any values. General-
ization replaces lower level domain values with higher level domain values. For example,
Age 27, 28 in the lower level can be replaced by the interval (27-28) in the higher level (See
Table 2).
In recent years, numerous algorithms have been proposed for implementing k-anonymity
via generalization and suppression. Samarati [13] presents an algorithm that exploits a bi-
nary search on the domain generalization hierarchy to find minimal k-anonymous table.
Sun et al. [14] recently improve his algorithm by integrating the hash-based technique. Ba-
yardo and Agrawal [3] presents an optimal algorithm that starts from a fully generalized
table and specializes the data set in a minimal k-anonymous table, exploiting ad hoc prun-
ing techniques. LeFevre et al. [8] describes an algorithm that uses a bottom-up technique
and a priori computation. Fung et al. [5] present a top-down heuristic to make a table to
be released k-anonymous. As to the theoretical results, Meyerson and Williams [11] and
Aggarwal et al. [1, 2] proved the optimal k-anonymity is NP-hard (based on the number of
cells and number of attributes that are generalized and suppressed) and describe approxi-
mation algorithms for optimal k-anonymity. Sun et al. [15] proved that k-anonymity prob-
lem is also NP-hard even in the restricted cases, which could imply the results in [1, 2, 11]
as well.
Anothermethod to achieve anonymity is throughmicro-aggregation [4]. Micro-aggregation
is an Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) technique consisting in the aggregation of indi-
vidual data. It can be considered as an SDC sub-discipline devoted to the protection of
individual data, also calledmicro-data. Micro-aggregation can be seen as a clustering prob-
lem with constraints on the size of the clusters. It is somehow related to other clustering
problems (e.g. dimension reduction or minimum squares design of clusters). However, the
main difference of the micro-aggregation problem is that it does not consider the number
of clusters to generate or the number of dimensions to reduce, but only the minimum num-
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ber of elements that are grouped in the same cluster. In this paper, we focus on the using
generalization and suppression.
While focusing on identity disclosure, k-anonymity model fails to protect attribute dis-
closure [7]. Several models such as p-sensitive k-anonymity [19], l-diversity [10], (α, k)-
anonymity [22] and t-closeness [9] were proposed in the literature in order to deal with
the problem of k-anonymity. The work presented in this paper is highly inspired by [19].
The main contribution of [19] is to introduce the p-sensitive k-anonymity property, which
requires, in addition to k-anonymity, that for each group of tuples with identical combina-
tion of quasi-identifier values, the number of distinct sensitive attributes values must be at
least p. However, depending on the nature of the sensitive attributes, even p-sensitive prop-
erty still permits the information to be disclosed. We identify in this paper situations when
p-sensitive property is not enough for privacy protection and we propose two solutions to
overcome this identified problem: (p, α)-sensitive and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity mod-
els and the heuristic algorithms to enforce these properties.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. We introduce some basic concepts and p-
sensitive k-anonymity model in Section 2. Enhanced p-sensitive k-anonymity models are
discussed in Section 3. Hardness results with respect to the enhanced models are discussed
in Section 4. Algorithmic issues are presented in Section 5 and the experimental results are
analyzed in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Problem Definitions
Let T be the initial micro data table and T ′ be the released micro data table. T ′ consists of
a set of tuples over an attribute set. The attributes characterizing micro data are classified
into the following three categories.
• Identifier attributes that can be used to identify a record such as Name and Medicare card.
• Quasi-identifier (QI) attributes that may be known by an intruder, such as Zip code and
Age. QI attributes are presented in the released micro data table T ′ as well as in the initial
micro data table T .
• Sensitive attributes that are assumed to be unknown to an intruder and need to be pro-
tected, such as Health Condition or ICD9Code 1. Sensitive attributes are presented both in
T and T ′.
In what follows we assume that the identifier attributes have been removed and the quasi-
identifier and sensitive attributes are usually kept in the released and initial micro data ta-
ble. Another assumption is that the value for the sensitive attributes are not available from
any external source. This assumption guarantees that an intruder can not use the sensi-
tive attributes to increase the chances of disclosure. Unfortunately, an intruder may use
record linkage techniques [21] between quasi-identifier attributes and external available
information to glean the identity of individuals from the modified micro data. To avoid
this possibility of privacy disclosure, one frequently used solution is to modify the initial
micro data, more specifically the quasi-identifier attributes values, in order to enforce the
k-anonymity property.
Definition 1. (Quasi-identifier)A quasi-identifier (QI) is a minimal set Q of attributes in micro
data table T that can be joined with external information to re-identify individual records (with
sufficiently high probability).
1available at http://www.icd9code.com/
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Name Age Country Zip Code
Rick 26 USA 14246
Hassen 45 India 13064
Rudy 25 Canada 14249
Yamazaki 48 Japan 13074
Table 3: External available information
Category ID Sensitive attribute values Sensitivity
One HIV, Cancer Top Secret
Two Phthisis, Hepatitis Secret
Three Heart Disease, Asthma Less Secret
Four Flu, Indigestion Non Secret
Table 4: Categories of Health Condition
Age Country Zip Code Health Condition
<30 America 142∗∗ HIV
<30 America 142∗∗ HIV
<30 America 142∗∗ Cancer
<30 America 142∗∗ Cancer
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Hepatitis
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Phthisis
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Asthma
>40 Asia 130∗∗ Heart Disease
3∗ America 142∗∗ Flu
3∗ America 142∗∗ Flu
3∗ America 142∗∗ Flu
3∗ America 142∗∗ Indigestion
Table 5: 2-sensitive 4-anonymous Micro data
Definition 2. (k-anonymity) The modified Micro data table T ′ is said to satisfy k-anonymity if
and only if each combination of quasi-identifier attributes in T ′ occurs at least k times.
A QI-group in the modified micro data T ′ is the set of all records in the table containing
identical values for the QI attributes. There is no consensus in the literature over the term
used to denote a QI-group. This term was not defined when k-anonymity was introduced
[13, 17]. More recent papers use different terminologies such as equivalence class [22] and
QI-cluster [18].
For example, let the set {Age, Country, Zip Code} be the quasi-identifier of Table 1. Table
2 is one 2-anonymous view of Table 1 since there are five QI-groups and the size of each
QI-group is at least 2. So k-anonymity can ensure that even though an intruder knows a
particular individual is in the k-anonymous micro data table T , s/he can not infer which
record in T corresponds to the individual with a probability greater than 1/k.
The k-anonymity property ensures protection against identity disclosure, i.e. the identifi-
cation of an entity (person, institution). However, as we will show next, it does not protect
the data against attribute disclosure, which occurs when the intruder finds something new
about a target entity.
Still consider the modified 2-anonymous table (Table 2), where the set of quasi-identifier
is composed of {Age, Country, Zip Code} and Health Condition is the sensitive attribute.
As we discussed above, identity disclosure does not happen in this modified micro data.
However, assuming that external information in Table 3 is available, attribute disclosure
can take place. If the intruder knows that in the modified table (Table 2) the Age attribute
was modified to ‘<30’, he can deduce that both Rick and Rudy have Cancer, even he does
not knowwhich record, 3 or 4, corresponds to which person. This example shows that even
if k-anonymity can well protect identity disclosure, sometimes it fails to protect against
sensitive attribute disclosure.
To deal with this problem in privacy breach, the p-sensitive k-anonymity model was in-
troduced in [19]. A similar privacy model, called l-diversity, is described in [10].
Definition 3. (p-sensitive k-anonymity) The modified micro data table T ′ satisfies p-sensitive k-
anonymity property if it satisfies k-anonymity, and for each QI-group in T ′, the number of distinct
values for each sensitive attribute occurs at least p times within the same QI-group.
Although the p-sensitive k-anonymity represents an important step beyond k-anonymity
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ID Age Country Zip Code Health Condition Category ID
1 <40 America 1424∗ HIV One
4 <40 America 1424∗ Cancer One
9 <40 America 1424∗ Flu Four
12 <40 America 1424∗ Indigestion Four
5 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Hepatitis Two
6 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Phthisis Two
7 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Asthma Three
8 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Heart Disease Three
2 <40 America 1420∗ HIV One
3 <40 America 1420∗ Cancer One
10 <40 America 1420∗ Flu Four
11 <40 America 1420∗ Flu Four
Table 6: (2+, 2)-sensitive 4-anonymous Micro data
in protecting against attribute disclosure, it still has some shortcomings. Following through,
we show that p-sensitive k-anonymity is insufficient to prevent Similarity Attack.
Similarity Attack: When the sensitive attribute values in a QI-group are distinct but similar sen-
sitivity, an adversary can learn important information.
Sometimes, the domain of the sensitive attributes, especially the categorical ones, can be
partitioned into categories according to the sensitivity of attributes. For example, in med-
ical data sets Table 1, the Health Condition attribute can be classified into four categories
(see Table 4). The different types of diseases are organized in a category domain. The at-
tribute values are very specific, for example they can represent HIV or Cancer, which are
both Top Secret information of the individuals. In the case that the initial micro data con-
tains specific sensitive attributes like Health Condition, the data owner can be interested in
protecting not only these most specific values, but also the category that the sensitive val-
ues belong to. For example, the information of a person affected with Top Secret needs to
be protected, no matter whether it is HIV or Cancer. If we modify the micro data to satisfy
p-sensitive k-anonymity property, it is possible that in a QI-group with p distinct sensitive
attribute values, all of them belong to the same pre-defined category. For instance, the val-
ues {HIV, HIV, Cancer, Cancer} in one QI-group in Table 5 all belong to Top Secret category.
To avoid such situations, we introduce our new enhanced p-sensitive k-anonymity models,
which are aware of not only protecting specific sensitive values.
3 Enhanced P -Sensitive K-Anonymity Models
Let S be a categorical sensitive attribute we want to protect against attribute disclosure.
First, we sort out the values of S according to their sensitivity, forming an ordered value
domainD, and then partition the attribute domain intom-categories (S1, S2, · · · , Sm), such
that S = ∪mi=1Si, Si ∩ Sj = ∅ (for i 6= j) and Sl is more sensitive than the Sk (for 1 ≤ l ≤ k).
For example, Consider the Health Condition S={HIV, Cancer, Phthisis, Hepatitis, Heart
Disease, Asthma, Flu, Indigestion} in Table 1, it has been partitioned into four categories
according to the sensitivity of the diseases (Table 4), where S1 (Top Secret) is the most
sensitive and S4 (Non Secret) is the least one.
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Furthermore, in order to measure the distance between two categories (attributes) and
the degree that sensitive attribute values contribute to one QI-group, we introduce the
following ordinal metric system.
Let D(S) denote a categorical domain of an attribute S and |D(S)| be the total number of
categories in domain D(S). The normalized distance between two categories Si and Sj of
the attribute S with Si ≤ Sj is:
d(Si, Sj) =
|Sl|Si ≤ Sl < Sj |
|D(S)| − 1
The distance between two sensitive attribute values is equal to the distance between the
categories that they fall into. Moreover, we put an ordinal weight to each category to rep-
resent the degree that each specific sensitive attribute value in S contributes to S.
LetD(S) = {S1, S2, · · · , Sk} denote a partition of categorical domain of an attribute S and
let weight(Si) denote the weight of category Si. Then,


weight(S1) = 0,
weight(Si) =
i−1
k−1
; 1 < i < k
weight(Sk) = 1,
(1)
Note that the weight of the specific sensitive value is equal to the weight of the category
that the specific value belongs to. The weight of the QI-group is the total weight of each
specific sensitive values that the QI-group contains.
We illustrate these concepts by taking Table 6 as an example. Given the partition of sen-
sitive attribute values as shown in Table 4 and four corresponding values set A={Cancer,
Phthisis, Asthma, Flu}. The distance between Cancer (S1) and Flu (S4) is 3/3=1, while the
distance between Phthisis (S2) and Asthma (S3) is 1/3. According to (1), weight(S1) = 0,
weight(S2) = 1/3 and weight(Asthma) = 2/3, weight(Flu) = 1, the total weight of A is
0+1/3+2/3+1=2.
Definition 4. ((p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity) The modified micro data table T ′ satisfies (p, α)-
sensitive k-anonymity property if it satisfies k-anonymity, and each QI-group has at least p distinct
sensitive attribute values with its total weight at least α.
Table 7 is a (3, 1)-sensitive 4-anonymous view of Table 1, since there are at least three dif-
ferent values in each QI-group and the least total weight of the QI-group is 1. We can easily
see that the (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity model can well protect sensitive information dis-
closure as well when compared with previous p-sensitive k-anonymity model.
Definition 5. ((p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity): Themodified micro data table T ′ satisfies (p+, α)-
sensitive k-anonymity property if it satisfies k-anonymity, and each QI-group has at least p distinct
categories of the sensitive attribute and its total weight is at least α.
Table 6 is a (2+, 2)-sensitive 4-anonymous view of Table 1. As you can see, for exam-
ple, the records 1,4,9 and 12 belong to one QI-group in which the Health Condition is not
that easy to be referred since they belong to two different categories with its total weight
2. Compared with previous 2-sensitive 4-anonymity model (See Table 5), our new model
could overcome the shortcomings of previous models and significantly reduce the possi-
bility of leaking privacy. Different from previous p-sensitive k-anonymity model which
publishes original specific sensitive attributes, we publish the categories that the sensitive
values belong to.
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ID Age Country Zip Code Disease weight total
1 <40 America 142∗∗ HIV 0
2 <40 America 142∗∗ HIV 0
3 <40 America 142∗∗ Cancer 0
1
9 <40 America 142∗∗ Flu 1
5 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Hepatitis 1/3
6 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Phthisis 1/3
7 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Asthma 2/3
2
8 >40 Asia 130∗∗ Obesity 2/3
4 <40 America 14∗ ∗ ∗ Cancer 0
10 <40 America 14∗ ∗ ∗ Flu 1
11 <40 America 14∗ ∗ ∗ Flu 1
3
12 <40 America 14∗ ∗ ∗ Indigestion 1
Table 7: (3, 1)-sensitive 4-anonymous Micro data
4 Hardness Results
Optimal p-sensitive k-anonymity problem is NP-hard as discussed in [19]. Now, we show
that optimal (p, α) and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity problems are also NP-hard.
Theorem 1: (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity problem is NP-hard for a binary alphabet (
∑
= {0, 1}).
Proof: The proof is by transforming the problem of EDGE PARTITION INTO 4-CLIQUES
[6] to the (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity problem.
EDGE PARTITION INTO 4-CLIQUES: Given a simple graph G = (V,E), with |E| = 6m
for some integerm, can the edges of G be partitioned intom edge-disjoint 4-cliques?
Given an instance of EDGE PARTITION INTO 4-CLIQUES. Set p = 2, α = 6 and k = 12.
For each vertex v ∈ V , construct a non-sensitive attribute. For each edge e ∈ E, where e =
(v1, v2), create a pair of records rv1,v2 and r˜v1,v2, where the two records have the attribute
values of both v1 and v2 equal to 1 and all other non-sensitive attribute values equal to 0,
but one record rv1,v2 has the sensitive attribute equal to 1 and the other record r˜v1,v2 has
the sensitive attribute equal to 0.
We define the cost of the (2, 6)-sensitive 12-anonymity to be the number of suppressions
applied in the data set. We show that the cost of the (2, 6)-sensitive 12-anonymity is at most
48m if and only if E can be partitioned into a collection ofm edge-disjoint 4-cliques.
Suppose E can be partitioned into a collection ofm disjoint 4-cliques. Consider a 4-clique
C with vertices v1, v2, v3 and v4. If we suppress the attributes v1, v2, v3 and v4 in the
12 records corresponding to the edges in C, then a cluster of these 12 records are formed
where each modified record has four ∗s. Note that the (p, α)-sensitive requirement can be
satisfied as the frequency of the sensitive attribute value 1 is equal to 6. The cost of the (2,
6)-sensitive 12-anonymity is equal to 12× 4×m = 48m.
Suppose the cost of the (2, 6)-sensitive 12-anonymity is at most 48m. As G is a simple
graph, any twelve records should have at least four attributes different. So, each record
should have at least four ∗s in the solution of the (2, 6)-sensitive 12-anonymity. Then, the
cost of the (2, 6)-sensitive 12-anonymity is at least 12 × 4 × m = 48m. Combining with
the proposition that the cost is at most 48m, we obtain the cost is exactly equal to 48m
and thus each record should have exactly four ∗s in the solution. Each cluster should have
exactly 12 records (where six have sensitive value 1 and the other six have sensitive value
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 1 (2008)
60 X. Sun, H. Wang, J. Li, T. M. Truta
Algorithm: Local-recoding Algorithm
1. fully generalize all tuples such that all tuples are equal.
2. let P be a set containing all these generalized tuples
3. S ← {P}; O ← ∅.
4. repeat
5. S′ ← ∅
6. for all P ∈ S so
7. specialize all tuples in P one level down in the generalization hierarchy
such that a number of specialized child nodes are formed.
8. unspecialize the nodes which do not satisfy (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity by
moving the tuples back to the parent node.
9. if the parent P does not satisfy (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity then.
10. unspecialize some tuples in the remaining child nodes so that
the parent P satisfies (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity
11. for all non-empty branches B of P , do S′ ← S′ ∪ {B}
12. S ← S′
13. if P is non-empty then O ← O ∪ {P}
14. until S = ∅
15. return O.
0). Suppose the twelve modified records contain four ∗s in attributes v1, v2, v3 and v4, the
records contain 0s in all other nonsensitive attributes. This corresponds to a 4-clique with
vertices v1, v2, v3 and v4. Thus, we conclude that the solution corresponds to a partition
into a collection ofm edge-disjoint 4-cliques. 
Corollary 1: (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity problem is NP-hard for a binary alphabet (
∑
=
{0, 1}).
Distortion Ratio: The cost of recoding is given by the Distortion Ratio of the resulting data
set and is defined as follows. Suppose the value of the attribute of a tuple (record) has not
been generalized, there will be no distortion. However, if the value of the attribute of a
tuple is generalized to a more general value in the taxonomy tree, there is a distortion of
the attribute of the tuple. If the value is generalized more (i.e. the original value is updated
to a value at the node of the taxonomy near to the root), the distortion will be greater. Thus,
the distortion of this value is defined in terms of the height of the value generalized. For
example, if the value has not been generalized, the height of the value generalized is equal
to 0. If the value has been generalized one level up in the taxonomy, the height of the value
generalized is equal to 1. Let hi,j be the height of the value generalized of attribute Si of
the tuple tj . The distortion of the whole data set is equal to the sum of the distortions of all
values in the generalized data set. That is, distortion=
∑
i,j hi,j . Distortion Ratio is equal to
the distortion of the generalized data set divided by the distortion of the fully generalized
data set, where the fully generalized data set is the one with all values of the attributes are
generalized to the root of the taxonomy tree.
These two new introduced models focus on different perspectives in protecting sensitive
attributes disclosures. Although (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity model still put the point on
the specific values, it includes an ordinal metric system to measure how much the spe-
cific sensitive attribute values contribute to each QI-group. Furthermore, instead of focus-
ing on the specific values of sensitive attributes, (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity model cares
more about the categories that the values belong to. Note that both models are effective in
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avoiding privacy breach, we could compare the Distortion Ratio of these two models in the
experimental study section.
5 The Algorithms
5.1 Global Recoding
We extend an existing global-recoding based algorithm called Incognito [8] for both (p, α)-
sensitive k-anonymity and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity models. Incognito algorithm is
an optimal global-recoding algorithm for the k-anonymity problem. It has also been used in
[19] for the p-sensitive k-anonymity problem. [8] and [19] make use ofmonotonicity property
in searching the solution space. The searches can be made efficient if a stopping condition
is satisfied. The stopping condition is that, if table T ′ is satisfied with the privacy require-
ments, then every generalization of T ′ is also satisfied with the privacy requirement.
The algorithms for generating (p+, α)-and (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymous tables tables, are
similar to [8, 19]. The difference is in the testing criteria of each candidate in the solution
space. [8] tests for the k-anonymity property and [19] tests the p-sensitive k-anonymity.
Here, we check the (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity prop-
erties.
5.2 Local Recoding
The extended Incognito algorithm is an exhaustive global recoding algorithm which is not
scalable and may generate excessive distortions to the data set. Here we propose a scal-
able local-recoding algorithm. In this section, we present a top-down approach to tackle
the problem. The idea of the algorithm is to first generalize all tuples completely so that,
initially, all tuples are generalized into one QI-group. Then, tuples are specialized in it-
erations. During the specialization, we must maintain (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity and
(p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity. The process continues until we cannot specialize the tuples
anymore. The code for (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity is described in Algorithm 1. The al-
gorithm for (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity is similar to Algorithm 1, the only difference is
to test (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity property in Line 9 and 11. For ease of illustration, we
present how the algorithm works for (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity for a quasi-identifier of
size 1.
Gender Zipcode Disease
Male 4351 HIV
Male 4351 Flu
Female 4351 HIV
Female 4352 Flu
No. Zipcode Disease
1 4351 HIV
2 4351 Flu
3 4351 HIV
4 4352 Flu
No. Zipcode Disease
1 4351 HIV
2 4351 Flu
3 435* HIV
4 435* Flu
Table 8: Left: Sample Data; Middle: Original Projected Table; Right: Generalized Table
Let us illustrate it with an example in Table 8 (Left). Suppose the QI contains Zipcode
only. Because there are only two sensitive values, so we assume that α, p, k = 2. Initially,
we generalize all four tuples completely to a most generalized value Zipcode=**** (Figure
1(a)). Then, we specialize each tuple one level down in the generalization hierarchy. We
obtain the branch with Zipcode = 4*** in Figure 1(b). In the next iterations, we obtain the
branch with Zipcode = 43** and the branch with Zipcode = 435* in Figure 1(c) and (d),
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Zipcode:****
Tuple:
Tuple:
Tuple:
Tuple:
Zipcode:4***
Zipcode:43***
Zipcode:435*
Specification
Specification
Specification
Specification
Zipcode:4351
Tuple: 4
Zipcode:4352
Tuple: 1,2,3
Specification
Zipcode:****
Tuple:
Zipcode:43***
Tuple:
Specification
Zipcode:4***
Tuple:
Specification
Specification
Zipcode:435*
Tuple: 4
Zipcode:4351
Tuple: 1,2
Zipcode:4352
Tuple:
Specification Specification
Zipcode:****
Tuple:
Specification
Zipcode:4***
Tuple:
Specification
Zipcode:43***
Tuple:
Specification
Zipcode:435*
Tuple: 3, 4
Specification Specification
Zipcode:4351
Tuple: 1,2,3
Zipcode:4352
Tuple:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f) (g)
Node B Node B
Figure 1: Algorithm for |QI|=1
respectively. Next, we can further specialize the tuples into the two branches as shown
Figure 1(e). Hence the specialization processing can be seen as the growth of a tree.
If each leaf node satisfies (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity, then the specialization will be suc-
cessful. However, wemay encounter some problematic leaf nodes that do not satisfy (p, α)-
sensitive k-anonymity. Then, all tuples in such leaf nodes will be pushed upwards in the
generalization hierarchy. In other words, those tuples cannot be specialized in this pro-
cess. They should be kept unspecialized in the parent node. For example, in Figure 1(e),
the leaf node with Zipcode = 4352 contains only one tuple, which violates (p, α)-sensitive
k-anonymity. Thus, we have to move this tuple back to the parent node with Zipcode =
435*. See Figure 1(f).
After the previous step, we move all tuples in problematic leaf nodes to the parent node.
However, if the collected tuples in the parent node do not satisfy (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity,
we should further move some tuples from other leaf nodes L to the parent node so that
the parent node can satisfy (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity while L also maintain the (p, α)-
sensitive k-anonymity. For instance, in Figure 1(f), the parent node with Zipcode = 435*
violates (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity. Thus, we should move one tuples upwards in the
node B with Zipcode = 4351 (which satisfies (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity). In this exam-
ple, wemove tuple 3 upwards to the parent node so that both the parent node and the node
B satisfy the (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity.
Finally, in Figure 1(g), we obtain a data set where the Zipcode of tuples 3 and 4 are gen-
eralized to 435* and the Zipcode of tuples 1 and 2 remains 4351. So the final allocation of
tuples in Figure 1(g) is the final distribution of tuples after the specialization. The results
can be found at the right in Table 8.
6 Experimental Study
The main goals of the experiments are to study the Similarity Attack on real data and to in-
vestigate the performance implications of the new introduced (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity
and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity approaches in terms of distortion ratio and execution
time.
In our experiment, we adopted the publicly available data set, Adult Database, at the UC
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Attribute Type Distinct values Height
Age Numeric 74 5
Workclass Categorical 8 3
Education Categorical 16 4
Country Categorical 41 3
Marital Status Categorical 7 3
Race Categorical 5 3
Gender Categorical 2 2
Health Condition Sensitive 8 –
Table 9: Features of Quasi-identifier with Sensitive Attribute
Irvine Machine Learning Repository [12], which has become the benchmark of this field
and was adopted by [8, 10, 5]. We used a configuration similar to [8, 10]. We eliminated the
records with unknown values. The resulting data set contains 45222 tuples. Seven of the
attributes were chosen as the quasi-identifier. We add a column with sensitive values called
“Health Condition” consisting of {HIV, Cancer, Phthisis, Hepatitis, Obesity, Asthma, Flu,
Indigestion} to the extracted data and randomly assign one sensitive value to each record
of the extracted data by. The random technique works in the following way. First, assign
a number to each sensitive attribute, i.e., {1:HIV, 2:Cancer, 3:Phthisis, 4:Hepatitis, 5:Obe-
sity, 6:Asthma, 7:Flu, 8:Indigestion}. Second, for each tuple (record), generate a random
number from 1-8. Then, assign the corresponding sensitive attribute value to the tuple. For
example, for the first tuple in the data set, if the random number is 5, then this record has
the sensitive value “Obesity”. Table 9 provides a brief description of the data including the
attributes we used, the type of each attribute data, the number of distinct values for each
attribute, and the height of the generalization hierarchy for each attribute. The implementa-
tion of Incognito is available at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/database/privacy/
code/l-diversity/incognito-ldiversity.tgz and we modified this implemen-
tation so that it produces (p, α)- and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymous tables as well. All the
experiments are run under Windows XP on a machine with 2.0GHz Pentium 4 processor
and 1GB RAM. The algorithms were implemented in Java.
Similarity Attack: We use the first 7 attributes in Table 9 as the quasi-identifier and treat
Health Condition as the sensitive attribute. We divide the 8 values of the Health Condition
attribute into four pre-defined equal-size categories, based on the confidentiality of the
values (See Table 4). Any QI-group that has all values falling in one category is viewed
as vulnerable to the similarity attack. We use p-sensitive k-anonymity algorithm [19] to
generate all p-sensitive k-anonymous tables. In total, there are 21 minimal tables and 13 of
them suffers from the Similarity attack. In one table, a total of 916 records can be inferred
about their sensitive value class. We also use the (p, α)- and (p,+ , α)-sensitive k-anonymity
algorithm to generate all 30 and 28 minimal tables, and found that only 7 and 3 of which
are vulnerable to the similarity attack, respectively (p = 2, k = 4, α = 2).
Efficiency: We compare the efficiency of the three privacy measures: (1) p-sensitive k-
anonymity; (2) (p, α)-sensitive k-anonymity (α = 2); (3) (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity
(α = 2). Results of efficiency experiments are shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 2(a) shows the running
times with fixed p = 4, k = 4, α = 2 and varied quasi-identifier size s, where 2 ≤ s ≤ 7. A
quasi-identifier of size s consists of the first s attributes listed in Table 9. Fig. 2(b) shows the
running times of the three privacy measures with the same quasi-identifier but with differ-
ent parameters for p and α. As shown in the figures, p-sensitive k-anonymity runs faster
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Figure 2: Efficiency of Three Privacy Measures
Figure 3: Distortion Ratio of Three Privacy Measures
than (p, α)-and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity; the difference gets larger when α increases.
Distortion ratio: Results of distortion ratio are shown in Fig. 3. From Fig. 3(a), it is easy
to see that the distortion ratio increases with the quasi-identifier size. This is because when
the quasi-identifier contains more attributes, there is more chance that the quasi-identifier
of two tuples are different. In other words, there is more chance that the tuples will be
generalized. Thus, the distortion ratio is greater. On average, the distortion ratio of p-
sensitive k-anonymity model results in almost three times bigger than that of (p, α)-and
(p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity models. In Fig. 3(b), when α increases, the distortion ra-
tio decreases. Intuitively, if α is greater, there is less requirement of metric α, yielding
fewer operations of generalization of the values in the data set. Thus, the distortion ratio is
smaller.
7 Conclusion
p-sensitive k-anonymity is a novel property that, when satisfied by micro data sets, can
help increase the privacy of the respondents whose data is being used. However, as shown
in the paper, to some extent, this property is not enough for protecting sensitive attributes.
In this paper, we proposed two enhanced p-sensitive k-anonymity models against Simi-
larity Attack, namely (p, α)-and (p+, α)-sensitive k-anonymity models. Our experimental
results show that our proposed models could significantly reduce the possibility of Similar-
ity Attack and incur less distortion ratio compared with previous p-sensitive k-anonymity
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